Introduction
While there is ample evidence that individuals respond to those with whom they interact repeatedly, it is still unclear how one interaction aects another structurally independent 1 interaction in which the same individual is involved. Recently, a wave of experimental studies has focused on the issue of behavioral spillovers by analyzing subjects' behavior in multiple games played either sequentially or simultaneously (see e.g. Bednar In this paper we focus on behavioral spillovers across games of the same type (public good games). Our experimental setup embeds dual group membership in a circular neighborhood of eight participants playing two structurally independent linear public good games for nitely many periods, each with just one neighbor -the left or the right one -so that in total eight games with overlapping two-player sets are played in each round. Structural independence of these games is guaranteed by a separate endowment, separate payos, and a dierent co-player.
Whereas the main, asymmetric, treatment features dierent left and right free-riding incentives, i.e. marginal per capita return, control treatments rely on symmetry.
Despite structural independence, we predict that one does not play each game separately and that his/her behavior can aect, over time, those with whom one is not directly interacting, since an individual's good or bad experience with one co-player may aect her or his interaction with the other co-player. When not only the games but also the free-riding incentives are the same, 1 An interaction is structurally independent if all parties involved are concerned only with their own payo and if these payos depend only on the behavior of the involved parties, that is if the set of all parties involved qualies as a cell according to the terminology of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . spillovers could not be attributed to their characteristics but only to behavioral eects. This may seem less obvious for the asymmetric treatment where dierent free-riding incentives could induce contributing dierently, i.e. independently left and right, thus questioning behavioral spillovers. Nevertheless, if the asymmetric treatment induce symmetry via not discriminating between neighbors who contribute similarly, this would enhance behavioral spillovers.
The behavioral assumptions behind the existence of this kind of spillovers, in our view, are that individuals are discrimination averse and conditional cooperators. An individual is said to be discrimination averse when not wanting to treat neighbors dierently. With such an individual, behavior in one interaction is likely linked to behavior in the other interaction what triggers an intra-personal behavioral spillover. Because of overlapping player sets, the conditionally cooperating pairs of neighbors, furthermore, trigger inter-personal spillovers. Due to this combination of intra-and inter-personal spillovers, to which we refer as purely behavioral spillovers, the neighborhood is predicted to evolve as a whole.
Participants receive feedback information only on own payo relevant contributions by their two neighbors and are thus free to react independently to each of them. However, if they are discrimination averse, they may want to align their behavior in both games. When such intra-personal spillovers apply to several members, who are conditionally cooperating 2 , interpersonal spillovers arise and possibly spread. In this case, individual behavior may, over time, aect more distant neighbors with whom one is not directly interacting. Therefore behavior may spread not only from one structural independent game to another but also aect the whole neighborhood.
We can describe individual group members as dual selves 3 with the two selves of each participant facing a dierent neighbor 4 . We illustrate the interplay between the contribution levels of the two selves in Figure 1 : for each individual member i we denote by L i and R i the 2 As in Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) . 3 Ideas of multiple selves date back to Plato (see Allen, 2006 ) who distinguished between passion and reason that can be related to systems 1 and 2 (see Kahneman, 2011) ; for recent discussions see Elster (2009) . 4 Due to dominance solvability (0-contributions are strictly dominant) each such self is a cell in the terminology of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) , i.e. each of the 8 local 2-person linear public good games has two proper subcells, one for each self of two interacting neighbors (see footnote 1 above).
contribution level in the left, respectively right game with the left i − 1, respectively the right i + 1 neighbor. The dashed bi-directional arrows indicate possible intra-personal spillovers, triggered by discrimination aversion (da ), whereas the two solid bi-directional arrows between neighbors symbolize possible conditional cooperation (cc).
Figure 1:
The interplay between intra-personal and inter-personal spillovers in our setup.
If one suers when both selves are treating two equals dierently, as postulated by discrimination aversion, an attempt to align both contribution levels could be triggered. Moreover, one can indirectly justify this by assuming inequity aversion 5 . As both neighbors are symmetric and should earn the same, aecting their payos dierently could generate inequality which one wants to avoid. But then in the asymmetric treatment the question arises which free-riding incentive should trigger the same left and right contributions. If individual contribution -aligning anchors on the larger (lower) contribution in both games, voluntary cooperation could be enhanced (hindered) due to intra-personal spillovers.
We distinguish four (between-subjects) treatments: the main asymmetric treatment with dierent free-riding incentives on both sides and three control treatments featuring free-riding incentives equal to the lower, the higher, and the average of the asymmetric one, respectively. Discrimination aversion, in the sense of wanting to contribute similarly in both games, should be stronger when the incentives are symmetric but may still exist when they dier. To test this robustness of discrimination aversion, our main treatment allows for dierent free-riding 5 See Fehr and Schmidt, (1999); Bolton and Ockenfels, (2000) ; for a survey, see Cooper and Kagel, (2016) . incentives in one's two games but maintains the symmetry of all eight members. Thus the asymmetric treatment presents a worst-case scenario for testing our main hypothesis of purely behavioral spillovers.
6 Our results, in fact, conrm purely behavioral spillovers, both for the asymmetric and the symmetric treatments.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 focuses on related literature. The experimental design is described in Section 3. Sections 4 states hypotheses and Section 5 analyzes the data.
The conclusions in Section 6 discuss our ndings and the methodological issues involved. The Appendix provides the English translation of the instructions for one treatment, 7 inter-group heterogeneity analysis, and additional data analysis.
2
On related behavioral spillovers studies Spillover dynamics across dierent and structurally independent games 8 , as in our setup is not a new topic. Our study shares some aspects with other experiments on behavioral spillovers Similarly to our design, they position (four) players on a circle, maintaining constant interaction with the left and right neighbor, but without informing participants about this. They consider the eects of cognitive load and behavioral spillovers linking individual choices across games.
Their evidence of both processes is related to entropy, a novel measure of behavioral variance. 6 As it is well known (see e.g. Isaac and Walker, 1988) there is a positive correlation between marginal per capita return and average contributions to public good when games are played in isolation but whether such correlation persists when public good games are jointly played is still an open question. 7 The treatment diers only in free-riding incentives. The whole set of instruction is available from the authors upon request. 8 Learning from repeatedly playing the same − as well as structurally dierent − (bidding) games has been referred to as robust learning. According to the evidence, reviewed by Güth (2002) , learning in playing the same game quickly becomes weak, whereas conditioning on dierent rules (i.e., on game types) is strong and persistent. 9 Theoretical analyses of multiple game plays have been provided by Samuelson (2001) , Jehiel (2005) and Bednar and Page (2007) .
More specically, the authors argue (and provide consistent ndings) that cognitive load has the greatest eect in games with high entropy while games with low entropy generate the largest spillovers onto games with high entropy. Cason et al. (2012) analyze minimum and median eort games, played both simultaneously and sequentially with same and with dierent group composition, to assess how behavior in one game aects behavior in the other. For the treatment with repeated simultaneous plays of the two types of games, which is most comparable to our design, they nd ecient coordination in the minimum eort game to occur less often than when the game is played after the median eort one, whereas there is no signicant dierence when it precedes the median eort game. For the treatments with simultaneous play and with the minimum eort game preceding the median eort one, they also fail to reject the hypothesis that average eort and average minimum eort are equal. Furthermore, they nd that simultaneous choices in the median game positively aects the choice in the minimum game while the opposite does not occur. In treatments with sequential play experience with ecient coordination in the median eort game aects behavior in subsequent play of the minimum eort game with the same group of subjects and this eect persists, though weakened, when group composition changes. The authors relate the existence of these behavioral spillovers to two structural characteristics of the considered games, namely strategic uncertainty (measured by entropy) and path-dependence, with the former being higher in minimum eort game and the latter stronger in the median eort game.
Cason and Gangadharan (2013) focus on behavioral spillovers between a cooperative environment (a threshold public goods game with stochastic provision) and a competitive environment (a double auction market). Without communication, cooperation in public good provision is lower when subjects simultaneously interact in the double auction market whereas they do not nd evidence that cooperation in public good game aects market price competition. The authors attribute this to the higher cognitive load of the simultaneous play. Savikhin and Sheremeta (2013) analyze repeated plays of a lottery contest and a linear public good game by xed groups of participants and nd that overbidding in the contest is lower when it is played simultaneously with the public good game than when it is played in isolation. However, there are no signicant dierences in contributions to the public good when it is played together with the lottery contest or in isolation. The authors argue that behavioral spillovers can be attributed to dierences in strategic uncertainty and path-dependence of the two game types. Since the contest features larger average volatility of bids, as compared to the average volatility of contributions to the public good, and contests are less path-dependent than public good contributions, the authors predict and conrm signicant spillovers eects from the public good game onto the lottery contest when the two games are played simultaneously. player facing two dierent co-player sets with whom one interacts repeatedly. This common player confronts two structurally independent games, as each group member in our experiment, but without a neighborhood structure. Furthermore, dierently from our setting, participants are not aware of being embedded in a larger matching group of nine participants who interact directly but also indirectly via common co-players. While the authors nd evidence of social interaction eects (participants tend to contribute on average more to the group which has contributed more in the previous period), they do not nd a statistically signicant dierence between average contributions in their two-group design and the control treatment with a single group.
In our view, similar behavior when playing one rather than two games can be due to both: that the two dierent co-players in both games react similarly to the same behavior and that they react dierently to the only common player of both games when this player does not align One may also wonder whether and how purely behavioral spillovers, intra-personal or interpersonal ones, are related to contagion eects 11 and social diusion dynamics (see, e.g., Cassar, 2007) . Such social dynamics for an exogenously given network are denied by the benchmark prediction based on common opportunism and backward induction based on nitely repeated elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies. In view of common opportunism, how one interacts with one neighbor should not matter for the interaction with the other neighbor, and backward induction should unravel all voluntary cooperation. This clear benchmark prediction is questioned not only by purely behavioral spillovers but also by contagion eects and their social diusion dynamics. 10 The "unpacking eect" is known to occur also in economic situations like the evaluation of private commodity bundles (see, e.g., Diamond and Hausman, 1994; and Bateman et al., 1997) . 11 Contagion can occur intra-personally, i.e. between one's two selves, as well as inter-personally. However, we do not refer to contagion which is better explored via repeated interaction experiments based on (random) strangers matching. 
(1) Imposing 0 < α n < 1 < 2α n for n = L, R renders free-riding, i.e., c T h with α L = α R = max{0.6, 0.8} = 0.8. We refer to T a as our main treatment since it features the worst-case scenario to validate purely behavioral spillovers. The control treatments symmetrically capture the dierent free-riding incentives of the main treatment T a , namely "lowest" via T l , "mean" via T m and "highest" via T h .
A challenge of purely behavioral spillovers and a familiar topic of supergame experiments is endgame behavior, i.e. how far backward induction unravels voluntary cooperation. To allow behavioral spillovers to be more systematically challenged by endgame behavior we distinguish earlier and later termination by implementing a supergame experiment with an endogenous restart 12 : constant neighborhoods play either 8 or 16 periods. Participants know that a supergame will last for 8 periods with probability of 1/3 and for 16 periods with probability of 2/3 and only learn after period 8 whether the long or short horizon has been randomly selected.
Constant groups (i.e. neighborhoods) with eight participants each experience four successive supergames. After each supergame, the same eight participants are randomly relocated within the neighborhood guaranteeing that each participant has at least one new neighbor, i.e. reshufing occurs within neighborhoods and not between them.
In each period of each supergame, all eight participants choose their contributions (c L i , c
simultaneously being aware of α L and α R . After each period, feedback information is provided only on own and the neighbors' contributions as far as they concern the own payo. To limit income eects across supergames, payment is the average payo of one (after the experiment) randomly selected supergame.
For control treatments T l and T h , we employed in total 48 and 40 subjects respectively, i.e.
6 and 5 independent groups; for treatments T m and T a a total of 96 subjects each, i.e. 12 independent groups each. All subjects played four supergames but because of random restart the number of observations diers across treatments with the same number of participants. Each session included two or three groups of eight participants and lasted about one hour.
13 No 12 We refer to this uncertainty as an endogenous restart possibility. We expected purely behavioral spillovers to limit but not exclude endgame eects (see Selten and Stöecker, 1986 ). 13 Our setting takes into account Manski's (1993) reection problem.
subject participated in more than one session. Altogether, 280 participants self-registered for participation through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) at CESARE lab (Luiss Guido Carli University).
Earnings (including a show-up fee of 5 euros) range from 11.4 euros to 32.4 euros, with an average of 20.55 euros. The experiment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007 ).
Hypotheses
We expect to conrm some well-established results in public good experiments as a robustness check for our design. Regarding the role of incentives we expect higher (lower) contribution levels and smaller (larger) free-riding in treatments with higher (lower) MPCR. We also expect declining voluntary cooperation up to endgame 14 but a less striking in period 8 than in period 16 endgame eect. Specically, we expect a recovery of voluntary cooperation in period 9 when learning about the endogenous restart.
Our central hypothesis, also the basis of some more specic hypotheses, claims behavioral spillovers across structurally independent local two-person public good games. In our view, such spillovers arise through the interplay of both intra-and inter-personal spillovers as triggered by discrimination (and indirectly by inequity) aversion as well as by conditional cooperation of neighbor pairs.
Without intra-personal spillovers there would be no behavioral contamination between one's left and right game. Thus our rst hypothesis presupposes Hypothesis 1: subjects do not play their two local games independently but rather correlate their contribution choice on their left and right side, even in T a for which we expect the weakest conrmation.
One reason is equity theory as early discussed by Homans (1961) . One wants to treat equal others equally, similarly to the equality before the law. Since in our experiment all neighbors are 14 See Andreoni (1988), the meta-study by Zelmer (2003) and the survey by Chaudhuri (2011).
symmetric, this could be the main driver of intra-personal spillovers. Other possible reasons for behaving similarly on both sides may be harmony seeking or avoiding the cognitive and emotional costs of arbitrary discrimination or conditioning on the past.
Without inter-personal spillovers there would be no behavioral contamination between neighbors' contribution to the public good. Thus our next hypothesis presupposes Hypothesis 2: subjects are willing to reciprocate with both their neighbors in the spirit of conditional cooperation.
Like, for instance, Fischbacher et al. (2001), we expect inter-personal spillovers to arise because of conditional cooperation: subjects react to past choices of those with whom they directly interact due to feedback information on own past outcomes and their neighbors' past contributions on which they depend. Furthermore, inter-personal spillovers resulting from conditional cooperation link contributions by neighbor pairs.
If left and right contributions are MPCR-dependent, this could imply much smaller left than right contribution for the asymmetric treatment. In the spirit of discrimination aversion, however, some participants may still abstain from treating neighbors rather unequally.
Results
To conrm the hypotheses stated in the previous section, the analysis proceeds as follows:
after investigating how free-riding incentives shape contribution choices and their dynamics in the dierent treatments, we test our specic behavioral hypotheses with the help of individual choice data. Finally, we demonstrate how purely behavioral spillovers aect the evolution of voluntary cooperation of the whole neighborhood, based on average group behavior and its dynamics. 15 Tables 11 and 12 in Appendix A also list average contributions separately for periods 1 − 8 and periods 9 − 16, showing similar results. 16 These dierences are signicant (p = 0.000) using conservative two independent-sample t-test where the unit of observation is frequency of (0, 0) contributions per supergame and aggregated across all periods.
Treatment eects and contribution dynamics
Statistically robust conrmation of the eects of incentives on average contributions is reported in Table 2. <Insert Table 2 here> For treatment testing in case of non-independent observations we follow the approach proposed by Moatt (2016, pp. 84-85) and run an OLS regression of average group contribution by period on single dummies for pairwise comparisons of treatments, clustering standard errors at the group level in order to adjust for time dependence. Due to having eight individuals per group and the rather low number of groups, the ultra-conservative approach (allowing only one aggregate observation per matching group) is not feasible. Our (second-best) approach, which clusters at the supergame per neighborhood level and results in 4 clusters per neighborhood, allows us to exploit the unique structure and reshuing mechanism of our design 17 .
This analysis conrms that, in the symmetric treatments, lower MPCR corresponds to a signicantly lower level of average contribution and, interestingly, in spite of the same average MPCR, contributions in T m are signicantly lower than contributions in T a (cluster-robust p-values in parenthesis).
Result 1:
-in symmetric treatments, average contributions increase when the MPCR is higher; -the asymmetric treatment T a triggers, in spite of the equal average productivity, higher average contribution and less free-riding than T m .
How average contributions to both public goods evolve in all treatments is graphically presented in Figure 4 . Average contributions in T a ("Asymmetric" in the gure) are higher than in T m ("Medium" in the gure) in every period, which is consistent with Result 1.
17 Participants of a group are reshued between supergames and guaranteed at least one new neighbor, while most receive a completely new set of neighbors (91.66% have a dierent neighbor on both sides). As expected, average contribution declines over time with a more substantial drop in period 8, when participants do not know whether the supergame will end or not (rst endgame eect).
However, voluntary cooperation recovers quickly in period 9 when learning that interaction continues, although this recovery is nearly absent from treatment T l . Contributions decline more drastically in the last possible period (second endgame eect) 18 .
Given the hierarchical structure of our data, we statistically conrm these eects via a multilevel regression model 19 ; in particular, when dealing with group contributions, we cluster at the session, supergame and group levels (with the addition of treatment level when the sample is pooled). Table 3 (and its full version, Table 13 , in Appendix A) reports regression results of average group contribution on supergame and period dummies using period 8 as the reference category. The sample for this analysis is restricted to supergames lasting 16 periods (see last row of Table 3 ) in order to test endgame and endogenous restart eects on the same pool of participants.
<Insert Table 3 here> The coecients associated to period dummies statistically conrm the descriptive analysis of contribution dynamics. With the exception of treatment T l , coecients increase in absolute value until period 8 when contributions reach their rst lowest level because of the rst endgame eect. However, in period 9 (and 10) participants in treatment T m and T a revive cooperation 20 , conrming the endogenous restart eect. Finally, contributions drop more substantially in the nal period, conrming the second endgame eect. 18 These dynamics of contributions are in line with other linear public good experiments, e.g. Andreoni (1988) , and therefore represent another robustness check for our results. 19 Even though our results are robust to other specications (such as two-limit panel tobit estimation), we believe that, because of the specic experimental design, the multilevel approach is the most appropriate since it allows to handle both group and session eects. Not using a two limit panel tobit estimation (i.e. not taking into account the censored structure of our dependent variables) leads, in our case, to similar levels of signicance but slightly reduces the magnitude of the eects; see Moatt (2016, pp. 92-97) for a discussion. 20 Figures 4, 6a and 6b suggest that a restart eect in period 9 is present also in T h . This is not conrmed by regression analysis, possibly because of smaller number of groups playing 16 periods in this treatment. <Insert Table 4 here> Table 5 reports statistical robust conrmation of the eect of the asymmetric free-riding incentives on average contribution 21 . The analysis conrms that contributions in T l are lower than those in T a,l and also reveals that there is no signicant dierence between contributions in T h and those in T a,r .
<Insert Table 5 here> Figure 5 visualizes the percentage share of zero, low (1, 2, 3), medium (4, 5, 6), and high (7, 8, 9) contributions for all four treatments. In case of the asymmetric treatment, it distinguishes left and right contributions. The share of zero contributions, as discussed in Table 1 , is lowest in T a,r ("Asymmetric right" in the gure) and T h ("High" in the gure). The peaks are at low contributions for all treatments, except for T h where the peak is at the medium level;
nally, the share of high contributions in T a,r is higher than in T h .
<Insert Figure 5 here> 21 The same methodological remark concerning Table 2 applies here, therefore we once again follow the procedure suggested by Moatt (2016, pp. 84-85) . -participants in T a tend to close the gap between left and right contributions; -behavior in T a is closer to that of T h than to that of T l , i.e. participants tend to anchor on the lower free-riding incentive in repeated interaction.
Overall, Results 1 and 2 constitute a robustness check for our design, since they provide evidence of well-established patterns of behavior in public good experiments; moreover they show some novel ndings related to the innovations that characterize our design, such as the endogenous restart eect. Furthermore, these results provide preliminary evidence that participants in the main asymmetric treatment T a tend to be guided more by the lower free-riding incentive, thus suggesting that intra-personal spillover may have occurred. To investigate these issues, in the next section we provide an in-depth analysis of behavioral spillovers triggered by the interplay of inter-and intra-personal ones.
Behavioral spillovers analysis
To demonstrate the existence of intra-personal spillovers, Table 6 reports correlations between individual left and right average contributions together with the signicance level in parentheses.
Although structurally independent, the two public good games are not played independently: the correlation between left and right individual average contributions are high and signicant.
Albeit generally higher than 50%, correlation is lowest for T a in all supergames due to its asymmetric incentives.
<Insert Table 6 here> Result 3: in spite of their structural independence, and in accordance to Hypothesis 1, average contributions to both local (left and right) public goods are behaviorally interdependent. Table 7 (a) displays the average contribution received by participants who contributed on average at least seven ECU to both their neighbors in all but the last period (hereafter High contributors) and the average contribution received by participants who are not high contributors (Everyone Else). Furthermore, Table 7 (b) presents the average contribution received by participants who contributed on average at most two ECU to both their neighbors in all but the last period (hereafter Low contributors) and the average contribution received by participants who are not low contributors (Everyone Else).
22 As the analysis presented in Table 7 (and   Tables 7, 14 conditional cooperation levels by their neighbors, compared to "Everyone Else" (p=0.000 for both independent-sample t-test). In our view, this results is consistent with Hypothesis 2 since it conrms the prevalence of conditional cooperation among our participants. 22 For High contributors, the threshold of at least seven ECU on both sides corresponds to the ninetieth percentile of the distribution of average own left and right contributions. For Low contributors, the threshold of two ECU is below the average contribution of all four treatments.
reveal that participants with a High (Low) Contributor on one side contribute more (less) on the opposite side than other participants (p=0.000 for Low contributors vs. Everyone else, using a two independent-sample t-test; High contributors vs. Everyone else is also signicant but the low number of observations, when aggregated, does not allow for enough test power).
This result is, in our view, evidence of intra-personal spillovers, as postulated by Hypothesis 1, as it indicates that participants link their two contribution choices.
<Insert Table 7 here>   <Insert Table 8 here>   Tables 14 and 15 To validate these ndings econometrically, we regress individual left (right) contribution in period t on own lagged left (right) contribution, supergame, period, and contributions made by both neighbors in period t − 1. We use a multilevel model with clusters at session, supergame, group and individual levels (see Table 9 ). <Insert Table 9 here> Table 9 shows that an individual's contribution on one side is signicantly aected by the same-side neighbor's (lagged) contribution, as suggested by the evidence of conditional cooperation, and also by the other neighbor's (lagged) contribution (except for the left contribution in T m and T h ), in line with intra-personal spillover eects. Finally, "supergame" is not systematically signicant whereas "period" has a small negative but signicant coecient (except for c R i in treatment T h ).
Result 5: one's left and right contributions depend signicantly on feedback (i.e. on own lagged contribution, supergame and period) as well as, for most treatments including T a , on past contributions by both neighbors. On average, higher past contribution by one's neighbor triggers higher present contributions to both neighbors, thereby conrming Hypotheses 1 and 2, which are jointly required by Hypothesis 3.
Summing up, the support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 strongly conrm purely behavioral spillover eects, claimed by Hypothesis 3, for most treatments and both, left and right, games including treatment T a whose unequal free-riding incentives could have weakened, even questioned, such spillovers. To trace distance eects we compute the sum of contributions (potentially) aected by member i's contribution choices in k = 0, 1, 2, 3 lags. For example, when k = 1 (respectively, k = 2, k = 3) we measure the sum of contributions to the public good games which take one (respectively, two, three) period(s) to be aected by member's i contributions. Obviously, when k = 0 we compute the sum of contributions to the two public good games in which member i is directly involved in.
Diusion of behavioral spillovers
The sum of contributions is denoted by F i (t + k), where t = 1, ..., 15 denotes period of play, and it is computed as follows:
With the help of this notation, we dene the distance dierence D k i as the absolute value of the dierence in aggregate contributions when k = 0 and when k = 1, 2, 3, as follows: contributions is received after every period, it takes one period to possibly aect a public good game that is one lag away, measured by D 1 i (t), two periods to aect a public good game that 23 We constrain our data analysis to all periods except for period 16, where endgame eect should overpower any spillover eects.
is two lags away, D 2 i (t), and three periods to aect a public good game that is three lags away, D 3 i (t). These distance dierences are based on minimal delay by which F i (t) may inuence F i (t + 1), F i (t + 2) and nally F i (t + 3). 6 Conclusion
We experimentally demonstrate that a constant neighborhood with eight members, who each repeatedly plays two structural independent games, is more than the parallel play of isolated games. Society members, although only bilaterally interacting, seem discrimination averse and are often conditionally cooperating, letting their group evolve as a "whole". Specically, they try to establish a high level of voluntary cooperation which generally quickly recovers when learning that the game goes on.
The main conclusion from our data analysis is that behavioral spillovers are pervasive. As one's left play evolves strictly with right play, on the basis of such individual positive correlation, most participants seem discrimination averse and link their behavior in both games. Therefore, when participants are also conditionally cooperating, this also spills over interpersonally.
More specically, this proves that:
-even across completely unrelated interactions we nevertheless generate our choice behavior in a holistic way, -local experiences, even when restricted to local feedback information only, can become gradually appreciated by more and more others, and -unequal free-riding incentives as in treatment T a may foster voluntary cooperation when participants interact repeatedly.
The last point suggests that in repeated collective-action tasks we may be more inuenced by good, e.g. eciency enhancing, experiences than by worse ones and that discrimination averse participants anchor more on their better experiences. This could have an interesting policy implication for reducing the costs of fostering cooperation when free-riding incentives can be manipulated.
Our analysis distinguishes between intra-personal spillovers, due to discrimination aversion, and inter-personal spillovers, due to conditional cooperation. Together they let neighborhoods with eight participants evolve as a whole interrelated society in spite of its eight local games being structurally independent. Actually, this allows us to trace how behavioral spillovers aect even more distant members across time. In future research it could be benecial to study more closely how behavior rst spills over intra-personally and then inter-personally by considering an experimental design which can provide even more informative data. In our neighborhood 
Tables and Figures
In the experiment you will be a member of a group containing a total of 8 members, including you. For the purpose of this experiment you and the rest of the members in the group are positioned in a circular manner. This means that each member has a neighbour to the left and a neighbour to the right.
During the experiment, each of you will interact with your two neighbors, and these two neighbors are going to be the same two individuals for 1 round. In the experiment, there will be a total of 4 rounds. One round lasts either 8 or 16 periods (as it will be explained later). Therefore you will have to make either 8 or 16 decisions before the round ends. At the end of each round, your group Table 9 : Five-nested multilevel regression of individual left (upper subtable) and right (lower subtable) contributions (clustered at session, group, supergame, and subject levels). (a) Appendix A -Additional Analysis 25 by "Low" "Medium" and "High" levels, using the same intervals as in In order to inspire intuition a few remarks are stated.
Remark 1: The left and the right neighborhoods in Figure 9 are quite homogeneous albeit diering considerably in their degree of voluntary cooperation. 
Appendix C -Instructions
You are participating in an experiment about economic decision-making. During the experiment, you can earn money. Your earnings will depend on your decisions and the decisions of others. These instructions describe the decisions you and other participants should take and how your earnings are calculated. Therefore, it is important to read them carefully.
During the experiment, all interactions between the participants will take place through computers. It is forbidden to communicate with other participants by any other means. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to answer it. Keep in mind that the experiment is anonymous, i.e., your identity will not be disclosed.
During the experiment, your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment, the points will be converted to Euros at the following exchange rate:
In the experiment, you will be a member of a group containing a total of eight members, including you. For the purpose of this experiment, you and the rest of the members in the group are positioned in a circular manner. This means that each member has a neighbor to the left and a neighbor to the right.
INSTRUCTIONS
During the experiment, all the interaction between the participants will take place through computers. It is forbidden to communicate with other participants by any means. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to answer it. Keep in mind that the experiment is anonymous, i.e., your identity will not be disclosed.
During the experiment, your winnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment the points will be converted to euro at the following exchange rate:
2 points = 0.5 € In the experiment you will be a member of a group containing a total of 8 members, including you. For the purpose of this experiment you and the rest of the members in the group are positioned in a circular manner. This means that each member has a neighbour to the left and a neighbour to the right.
During the experiment, each of you will interact with your two neighbors, and these two neighbors are going to be the same two individuals for 1 round. In the experiment, there will be a total of 4 rounds. One round lasts either 8 or 16 periods (as it will be explained later). Therefore you will have to make either 8 or 16 decisions before the round ends. At the end of each round, your group During the experiment, each of you will interact with your two neighbors. These two neighbors will be the same two individuals for one supergame. In the experiment, there will be a total of four supergames. One supergame lasts either 8 or 16 periods (as will be explained later). Therefore, you will have to make either 8 or 16 decisions before the supergame ends. At the end of each supergame, your group consisting of eight members will be reshued randomly.
For every member, at least one neighbor will be dierent from the previous supergame. Keep in mind that you do not know the identity of your neighbors so you will not know if both of your neighbors are new, or just one of them.
How many periods a supergame lasts depends on chance. A supergame will last for 8 periods with a probability of 1/3, and 16 periods with probability of 2/3.
In each period, you and your two neighbors will be endowed with points. More specically, nine (9) points will be assigned to you for the interaction with your left neighbor, and nine (9) points will be assigned to you for the interaction with your right neighbor. The same number of points will be assigned to both of your neighbors, and all other members in your group.
In each period, you will have to decide, individually and independently, how many of the nine points you are endowed with you will want to contribute to a project with your left neighbor. In what follows, this is referred to as Project L. Similarly, in each period you will have to decide, individually and independently, how many of the nine points you are endowed with you will want to contribute to a project with your right neighbor. In what follows, this is referred to as Project R.
Keep in mind that you can invest a maximum of 9 points to Project R and a maximum of 9 points to Project L; moreover, you cannot invest your points for Project R into Project L, and vice versa.
You will retain for yourself the points that you decide not to invest in either project. Therefore, you will keep for yourself 9 −Your contribution to Project L; similarly you will keep for yourself 9 −Your contribution to Project R. For example, you can invest 8 points in project R, and keep 9 − 8 = 1 for yourself, or invest 3 points in Project L and keep 9 − 3 = 6 to yourself.
Every member is going to make the decisions simultaneously.
PAYOFFS
Your payo in each supergame will depend only on your own choices and on those of your two neighbors
At the end of each period, your payo is computed in the following manner:
For Project R: ( EXAMPLE: Let's try to compute your payo with the example given above. For the purpose of the example we imagine that both your right and left sided neighbors contribute 8 points.
If you contribute 8 points into Project R, your payo will be 0.7 * (8 + 8) + 1 = 0.7 * 16 + 1 = 11.2 + 1 = 12.2. Similarly, if you contribute 3 points into Project L, your payo will be 0.7 * (3 + 8) + 6 = 7.7 + 6 = 13.3.
In each of the successive periods, all group members will simultaneously choose their contributions to Project R and to Project L. Keep in mind that you play multiple periods with the same participants and that you decide about your own contribution without knowing the contributions of your neighbors.
At the end of each period, each group member will be informed about own payos from Project L and from Project R, contributions by both left and right neighbors, and accumulated earnings from both projects.
What you will actually earn is:
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select the average payo you obtained in one of the four supergames as a nal payment. Thus your payment will be equal to the average payo of supergame 1, or to the average payo of supergame 2, or to the average payo of supergame 3, or to the average payo of supergame 4. Such a payo will be converted to Euros at the exchange rate of 1 point = 1 A C .
